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14 What Authorizes the Image? The Visual 
Economy of Post-Secular Jurisprudence 
RICHARD K. SHERWIN 
What appears in the image field is not subordina te to existing reality, it consti-
tutes that reality. 
Katharina Grosse' 
The soul actualizes truth through the experience of sublimity. 
Werner Herzog2 
On the Nature of "Visual Economy" 
Picture a canvas by Mark Rothko: let's say, "Four Darks in Red " (1958) 
(figure 14.1): Across an expanse nearly ten feet wide, four bands of col-
our are laid out one after another - brown, the thinnest; black, the most 
expansive; then maroon and red. The black has the most weigh t; it is 
portentous in its depth. All four bands seem to drift in an encompass-
ing sea of roseate light, which suffuses around the cloud-like edges of 
the slightly darker, lower band. That band has been made to contract 
further away from the edges of the painting than the other three, as if 
the light behind it could not be contained . Absent figures or rep resen-
tations of an y kind, there are no stories to tell. Words fall away, as will 
happen when one is immersed in music. All that remains is the slow 
dance of these shimmering colour forms, and your own gaze feeling 
its way across, around, and within the canvas. It is a strange visual 
dance, as if accompanied by an otherworldly score, watching subtle 
hues (black within black, red within red) separate out and move among 
themselves within each separate band, as each band oscillates against 
the unsettled borders of its neighbour, and the ensemble oscillates 
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together as a unified whole within the larger luminous field of incan-
descent red. Without words, affect surges. An uncanny joy pierces the 
heart, a deathly despair, an insistent hope - as of daybreak ... 
Where are we? How did we get here? What does it mean? And what 
could this possibly have to do with law? 
In order to gain our bearings we first need to grapple with the word 
"economy," and in particular with the notion of a visual economy. It 
is not the exchange of capital, commodities, and labour that I have in 
mind here, but rather an earlier meaning for "economy" - one that 
derives from the Greek oikonomia: oikos, meaning "dwelling place," 
and nomia meaning management or organization, especially of worldly 
Figure 14.1 Mark Rothko (1903-70). "Four Darks in Red" (1958). Oil on canvas, 
10113/16 x 1163/8in. (258.6 x 295.6 cm). Whitney Museum of American Art, 
New York; purchase, with funds from the Friends of the Whitney Museum of 
American Art, Mr. and Mrs. Eugene M. Schwartz, Mrs. Samuel A. Seaver and 
Charles Simon. Photography by Sheldan C. Collins. 
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affairs. Economy in this sense is the place where things of this world are 
properly administered.3 Reflecting on the way we manage the world 
(or worlds) we live in invites us to consider anew the different moral 
values and aesthetic registers through which reality takes shape for us. 
How do things and others in the world appear? 
In order to take shape first there must be a space to take place in, an 
oikos. So we ask, what is the nature of the space in which things appear 
and circulate around us?4 How are the various elements of what appears 
organized in that space? What is their nomia? As soon as we speak of 
appearances, we confront time as well as space: a before and after. Out 
of what did it appear? How do we understand the relation between the 
appearance and its source? Its authorship, if you will. What is it that 
authorizes such a presence? "In the image of" what does it appear? 
What is its mode of emergence, transmission, encounter? How is to be 
understood? What does it demand of us? These are the so.rts of ques-
tions a visual economy is meant to account for. 
Human institutions, including law, reflect and implement a domi-
nant visual economy. In different eras, different cultures have enjoyed 
vastly different visual economies. For instance, in Homeric Greece one 
encounters the economy of display where physical and social worth is 
constructed by the other's gaze. "Look at me!" Achilles says in the Iliad. 
"Do you not see how beautiful, noble and great I am?"5 Yet, by the fifth 
century BCE, in the democratic Athenian polis, the economy of public 
display has transformed into an economy of public speech. The citi-
zen's gaze now produces (and is a product of) the field of public perfor-
mance constituted as participatory spectator and political contestant.6 
Or consider Byzantium, in the eleventh century, the time of Constan-
tine. For Orthodox iconophilic Christians like Nikephoros, the gaze 
was constituted by the economy of the Incarnation. It is the Incarnation 
that lets the world be seen. An invisible God must sacrifice an intimate 
part of himself, his only Son, in order to create a visible space for God's 
infinite presence in the world. The Incarnation - the way the infinite 
occupies material space - must be sacrificial, broken, kenotic, for the 
infinite will not appear. It always recedes from view. The icon unified 
the administration of worldly affairs (including law, belief, and mate-
rial goods) in the image of God's sacrifice of His only Son. The eco-
nomic imaginary of the icon modelled that sacrifice. When God became 
flesh (as word/image/body) the world became visible.7 
As these examples may suggest, different visual economies establish 
the world we live in by constituting how the eye sees.8 How do we 
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know reality? What constitutes its truth? Does it touch the tactile image 
(in the presence of a pious painter like Giotto)? Does it break with form 
in the quest for unseen reality (before the uncanny coloured splotches 
of Fra Angelica, say, or Vermeer)?9 Closer to our own time, we may 
ask whether reality is present in the ecstatic, despairing colour fields 
of Rothko and the numinous, post-secular spaces of Barnett Newman? 
Or does it appear to us more like a jumble of fragmented remains, dis-
parate feelings, or non-signifying affects, as we dance on the surface of 
visual forms in ornamental delight, as when we watch a Hollywood 
blockbuster, momentarily casting our lot with the life of another for a 
cry or a laugh before the screen goes dark? A matter, we might say, of 
image as Hollywood idol. 
If the visual economy constitutes the reality in which we live, includ-
ing the network of beliefs, laws, and institutions that make up our 
worldly existence, who is (or will be) master of the image?10 What 
authorizes the image? What is the source of law's legitimacy in the 
"visiocracy" we call home?11 
From Iconology to Semiotics (and Back Again) 
On the heels of the ruinous, seemingly endless religious and civil wars 
of the seventeenth century, early modern Europeans began to turn their 
gaze away from sectarian sources for legal authority. Foremost among 
them in this regard was Thomas Hobbes. It was Hobbes who gave us the 
political triad of sovereignty (the "artificial Soul"), positive law ("artifi-
cial Reason"), and the state (that artificial Leviathan, also known as the 
Commonwealth), bound togeth~r by contract: ceding power to the one, 
or the many, who represents the people. 12 In short, it was Hobbes who 
first blazed the trail for secular positivist legal thinking. The state and 
its laws were now viewed as manifestly human constructs, authorized 
not by God but by collective consent. Law ruled semiotically: defining 
the terms of representation and exchange. Over the years, as transcen-
dental references continued to weaken, the premodern visual economy 
of living symbols entered a prolonged state of collapse. This develop-
ment pushed semiotics to the limits of its legitimating power, and per-
haps beyond. 
What would it be like to reimagine law not simply in terms of semi-
otics or abstract concepts, but also as a visual economy, a matter of 
embodied seeing? What would it mean to picture a corpus less akin 
to Hobbes's legal machinery than to a network of interlinked, living 
334 Richard K. Sherwin 
symbols, where rational categories yield at least equal respect to embod-
ied states and embodied knowledge (affects, feelings, emotions),13 and 
in which legal institutions that establish and maintain basic concepts 
(such as due process, equal protection, and liberty for all) also help to 
express and perform a preferential range of shared emotions? Imagine 
a state in which everyone recognizes that structures of feelings help to 
create both individual identity and social reality, and in which legal 
institutions help us to avoid "bad civic passions" (such as fear, envy, 
and shame) while promoting the good (compassion, respect, perhaps 
even love).14 
What if law were viewed less as a metric system than a musical 
composition, a public performance, a work of art: not simply a passive 
archive of written rules, policies, and principles, but also, and perhaps 
even more importantly, a theatre in which we perform a shared reality, 
clearing a space- an oikos -for reality to appear? What could make that 
happen? 
When semiotics began to displace living symbols, science took over 
from theology and the humanities, displacing rhetoric in particular 
as the leading source of authorized knowledge.15 In the disembodied 
epistemology of science, non-sensual truth becomes, as Heidegger 
put it, a matter of discerning the adequation between image and some 
underlying model. What is "adequate" in this context is a function of 
some form of imitation or measurement, whether it is based on a Pla-
tonic ideal form or an alternative metrical system. In this kind of visual 
economy - let us call it the economy of "mimesis as imitation" - good 
images are accurate copies. 
Now while science may excel in establishing conditions of accurate 
measurement based on formal conditions of validity, it is sorely lack-
ing in providing a basis for structures of feeling, or a preferred net-
work of embodied knowledge. Science is not cut out to express what 
binds us to a particular model or belief. Discerning the source of an 
uncanny or sublime presence, what Heidegger calls "the ecstatic play 
of the world," is beyond its ken. The economy of the sublime, of mimesis 
as appearance or event,16 insists upon a very different ground of truth 
than accurate imitation. Symbolic or iconic truth coincides with what 
the image reveals in our encounter with it. This kind of phenomeno-
logical exchange in the face of the iconic image is more akin to per-
formance. Something happens. The image brings something (perhaps 
some form of being) into a clearing, created within the space of the 
image, for the gaze to encounter.17 
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Experiencing law's validity as a matter of its compliance with the 
right set of rules or principles without any sense of its felt significance, 
which is to say, without an adequate account of what binds us to law's 
authority in the first place,18 leads us to Kafka's law: a law that is valid, 
but lacks significance.19 For Gersholm Scholem, this encounter with the 
dead spirit of the law describes the nothingness of revelation, the zero 
point of law and politics, the state of exception. Valid legal forms may 
proliferate in baroque and neo-baroque spectacle, but that profusion 
cannot distract us forever from sensing the emptiness at the core.20 To 
counter that lack requires an event - the advent of meaning. 
Scientific objectivity can tell us nothing about the advent of law's 
significance. For that we need living symbols in the visual economy 
of presence. We can see this is so when we consider the genealogy of 
law's legitimation over time. For example, it was the visual economy 
of the Incarnation - that phantasmal presence in the imperial coin 
(the emperor in the image of Christ),21 the Orthodox icon,22 the king's 
two bodies,23 and the legal emblem24 - that once authorized law's 
worldly power, "making power visible,"25 giving proof to its invis-
ible spiritual source.26 
In the pre- and early modern visual economy of the living icon 
the image precedes the word.27 As Goodrich points out, the tripartite 
structure of the legal emblem recapitulates the threefold unity of the 
Incarnation, the image made flesh.28 But over time, what began as a 
transcendental, symbolic visual economy devolved into something far 
different: a secular legal positivism, the modern semiotic economy of 
signs and definitions. 
And yet, there remained a ghost in the secular machinery of positive 
law: the enigmatic aura, the unrepresentable, inconceivable (but per-
haps not insensible) "Other" of law. In the material semiotic age of sci-
ence and technology, the economy of signs appeared to have displaced 
the auratic symbol. But like Banquo's ghost, it "will not down."29 What 
could be the source today of such a phantasmal legitimating presence? 
From what visual economy could it arise? 
Post-secular Jurisprudence:The New Visual Economy of Presence 
Eric Santner locates a crucial shift in the visual economy of the early 
modern legal emblem from the "King's two bodies" (secular and 
divine) to the "People's two bodies." The sovereign that the people cre-
ate by contracting their rights to their representative contains a surplus, 
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an irreducible excess that Santner calls "the flesh" ("a sublime somatic 
materiality").30 This uncanny surplus describes what remains of tran-
scendence.31 It is what passes from the divine sovereignty of the King to 
the popular sovereignty of the People. 
Imagine the Hobbesian contract of civil representation not simply as 
words in a document, but also as something iconic in its overdetermi-
nation. What if, in order to fit on the page, the social contract could 
not contract enough the foundational source of power it was meant to 
carry? What if we viewed that constitutive contract as a living symbol, 
an icon, which is to say, irreducibJe to words alone?32 
What spirit hovers behind the visible signs of civil commitment, 
as if scintillating within a sea of roseate light on a canvas painted by 
Rothko? If we were to try to imagine such a possibility, how would we 
describe its visual economy? 
In our psychological times, we might well begin with interior space, 
the domain of libido. That is Santner's point of departure: the flesh 
imagined as an invisible residue of uncontainable, uncircumscrib-
able transcendence, for libido (unconscious Eros) always exceeds the 
material body. In Freudian terms, when we "cathect" libido - transfer-
ring Eros from our body to something beyond it, including expressive 
forms - we enter into relation with those forms, including others and 
the world around us. We might say that the body politic acts similarly. 
We collectively invest libidinal energy in, and thus bind with various 
objects, others, stories, and ideals. These in tum become charged with 
libidinal excess. If the object in question is a document, a contract or 
foundational constitution, say, that excess is the felt presence that binds 
us. In this sense, the social bond is an excess of meaning. It charges and 
sustains (so long as it lasts) a shared belief in a cultural construct, an 
oikonomia, if you will, that legitimates the power of the state. 
This is how we might talk about a contract that rules with uncanny 
vitality, as an emotional construct, or a symbolic form of life. Thi~ is the 
enigmatic flesh of the law imagined in terms of a sublime materiality.33 
An economy ("oikonomia") imagined as that space in which we manage 
the material world (of goods and institutions) in the image of some-
thing uncontainable, something sublime. 
Santner calls this uncanny phenomenon "the royal remains." It is, he 
says, how the king's transcendent body appears in modernity: how the 
enigmatic presence of the royal remains was reconstituted in the body 
politic of popular sovereignty.34 But it doesn't just happen, like a trans-
action in which goods, or goods and currency, are exchanged in a sale 
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that's final. It persists. Or it doesn't. Its viability depends on a currency 
that doesn't appear at all, namely, libidinal cathexis. Without that ani-
mus, that uncanny surplus, the laws may be valid but lack significance. 
Under such conditions, legitimacy is but a rumour. 
That is the revolutionary ramification of spiritual and libidinal capi-
tal: absent its enigmatic presence the social contract fails. If the basis 
for a particular cultural form of life disappears, if the currency - What 
Santner calls "biocratic investiture"35 - that makes a legal regime func-
tion, becomes too weak to support the state's demands, the constitu-
tive structure of belief collapses. If libidinal investment sustains the · 
state, libidinal dis-investment (collective de-cathexis) augurs its fall, 
its deadly spiral into the state of exception, the zero point of law and 
politics, a state of perpetual terror. That is what happens when we with-
draw our love for objects and others in the world around us. The exter-
nal world crumbles, mirroring an internal catastrophe.36 
Let's see if there is a visual economy in which we can visualize the 
flesh of the law in a similarly corporeal representation. 
Reimagining the Visual Economy of Post-secular Jurisprudence 
In art, the unspoken, unfigurable source of beauty calls to us. It demands 
a response from the spectator's gaze. The relationship we enter in the 
poetic space of beauty's presence is described in the phenomenology 
of aesthetics.37 In law, justice likewise comes to us as an infinite, uncon-
tainable force. We stand before the Other, whose suffering demands a 
response. In the visual economy of law justice hovers beyond the field 
of our vision, like an uncanny, enigmatic presence. It haunts us. Always 
unrealized, always beyond our grasp - and yet, it is justice that ani-
mates law, lending it significance. We feel this, particularly in certain 
forms and performances of law, even if we cannot always name it. That 
feeling binds us to law. Our cathected relationship to others and objects 
(including texts and ideals) is a relationship of significance. We may 
describe this as the phenomenology of the ethical.38 
What Eric Santner calls "the royal remains" coincides with the phan-
tasmal presence that invisibly bestows legitimacy upon law. In the 
immediate aftermath of the French revolution, Santner senses that 
presence in Jacques-Louis David's famous painting, "Death of Marat." 
Santner credits art historian T.J. Clark with the critical insight at work 
here. Quoting Clark: "In the cult of Marat [David saw] the first forms of 
a liturgy and ritual iri which the truths of the revolution itself would be 
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made flesh- People, Nation, Virtue, Reason, Liberty."39 But how would 
such a "liturgy" find an appropriate form of expression? Santner dis-
cerns an aesthetic revolution at work in David's painting. It emerges 
as a new kind of abstraction. The painter "seems to make Marat much 
the same substance - the same abstract material - as the empty space 
above him."40 Equating that enigmatic space with the King's sublime 
body ("the flesh"), this abstraction of sovereignty, its sudden vacancy, 
symbolizes "the impossible representation of the People."41 
Revolutionary, indeed. No less is at stake than the dissolution of the 
iconic representation of the Incarnation of Christ, established for centu-
ries, as the underlying model for the King's transcendental body. What 
we are witnessing is a profound shift in the visual economy of law 
and politics. According to Santner, the inability to represent the royal 
remains in the transcendental body of the People (an aporia he refers to 
as "representational deadlock")42 describes the status of popular sov-
ereignty in the post-Revolutionary age of modernity. The masses who 
once comprised the Hobbesian Leviathan (pictured in the famous fron-
tispiece of Hobbes' mid-seventeenth-century political handbook) have 
now dissolved into an absence. This charged absence is the abstract 
animated field we all carry within ourselves: the uncontainable excess 
of Eros. In this new visual economy, popular sovereignty is animated by 
a libidinal excess, or somatic surplus of immanence that every citizen 
carries within his or her own body. 
With Rothko, and the mid-twentieth-century emergence of abstract 
expressionism in general, the visual economy of the image that we first 
witnessed in David's enigmatic abstraction has developed even fur-
ther. Now all representational form has been evacuated. Only a shim-
mering coloured field remains. The mysterious legitimating source of 
somatic excess, the royal remains that have been transferred to popular 
sovereignty, has become an entirely abstract expression. But this may 
hardly come as a source of political comfort. After all, how many peo-
ple see (much less seek out) in the work of Rothko a source of iconic 
mastery - making a space for the mystery of the infinite to materialize 
in the world? A source of legitimacy that has grown this esoteric, so far 
removed from more familiar rites and liturgies of popular investiture, 
is an unlikely basis for a sustainable visual economy of law. 
Yet, without understating the gravity of an incipient legitimation cri-
sis that has dogged the liberal state throughout late modernity,43 access 
to a source of legitimation may lie closer to hand. Perhaps as close as 
the nearest screen. 
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If we begin with the ontology of the image, before long - amidst the 
various registers of being, from sublime presence to sensorial delight, 
that different kinds of images allow (or preclude) -we come across what 
visual ethnographer David MacDougal calls "the corporeal image."44 
MacDougal's notion of seeing with the whole body may be read against 
the current cultural backdrop of the "affective turn," including renewed 
interest in embodied or "synaesthetic" knowledge.45 Of particular inter-
est here is what the corporeal image cannot configure, which is to say, 
our encounter with its· excess, the sublime shimmer that accompanies 
its mysterious overdetermination.46 That excess is what makes us shud-
der when we gaze upon the charged abstract colour fields of a work 
by Rothko, or the sudden, inexplicable vacancy in David's "Marat." 
The surplus of immanence that we encounter in the ontological field of 
corporeal images is irreducible to what we see there. 
Film, television, and video images, on screens large and small, 
serve as immensely accessible "popular" sites where corporeal 
(among many other kinds of) images are in continuous play. The 
vast circulation of images made possible by new visual technolo-
gies keeps alive the prospect that the mysterious source of popular 
sovereignty in the visual economy of law remains before us. At the 
same time, however, the very profusion of visual images today also 
keeps alive the prospect of continued obscurity, burying the corpo-
real image in the neo-baroque clamour and clutter of undifferenti-
ated visual spectacle.47 
This defines the visual challenge of our time. Before law's legitima-
tion may be stabilized within a still emergent visual economy, enough 
contemporary artists, cultural critics, and jurists need be amassed to 
assimilate and clarify its aesthetic and ethical demands and registers. 
Only then can that vision be broadly and effectively distributed and 
shared within the body politic. This process of clarification may well 
be the most profound task of culture, namely: to sustain the legal and 
political groundwork necessary for both law's and culture's produc-
tion, maintenance, and vitality. 
To illustrate in greater particularity the claim that the "corporeal 
image" is closer than the example of abstract expressionism may sug-
gest, one could choose from an extensive archive of films which, to a 
greater or lesser degree, shimmer with a kind of uncanny corporeal 
excess. The dictates of limited space allow only a brief example here, 
drawing on two closely interconnected films by the contemporary film-
maker Joshua Oppenheimer. 
340 Richard K. Sherwin 
The Visual Economy of an Ethically Inflected Aesthetic 
Oppenheimer's "The Act of Killing" (2012) and "The Look of Silence" 
(2014) not only recapitulate in their subject matter the genealogy of 
law's legitimation, but also aesthetically model the way presence in 
corporeal images - as well as a deadly vacancy in dizzingly baroque 
forms - work on the screen. In short, the films perform an integrated 
visual economy for law and politics in which discrete ethical and aes-
thetic registers dialectically play out. 
A group of high-level army officers has staged a coup. To legitimate 
their action they characterize it as a necessary response to a ferocious 
"enemy within" that is threatening to violently seize the state. In the 
aftermath of the coup, they unleash a killing operation in which enemies 
of the state (alleged "Communists") are rounded up and slaughtered. 
No exact estimate exists, but more than five hundred thousand people 
were killed in this way. Violence on such a massive scale exceeded the 
capacity of the army without assistance. Accordingly, the state enlisted 
a civilian cadre of willing killers within a widely distributed network 
of local militias. This happened in Indonesia in 1965-6. The leaders of 
the coup remained in power for over four decades thereafter. As co-
agents of that political and military triumph, the civilian killers were 
subsequently praised as heroes of the state. And for all these years, the 
survivors of mass violence, along with the families and friends of the 
victims, were subjected to continued oppression (from crude shake-
downs in the marketplace to the utter silencing of political dissent) by 
the thugs, gangsters, and neo-fascist militias that continued to serve the 
state's needs. · 
Enter Joshua Oppenheimer, who asks: What is it like to live with the 
knowledge that you have murdered in cold blood scores, perhaps even 
hundreds, of innocent people? And what is it like for the victims to live 
within a regime of such repressive silence? "The Act of Killing" poses 
the first question. "The Look of Silence" poses the second. 
Oppenheimer found that the aging killers, when approached, were 
only too happy to recount the brutal torture and mass murder that they 
had committed in their youth. And so the filmmaker enters a strange 
state of play, providing the killers both the opportunity and the techni-
cal means to make a film of their violent and sadistic exploits. Anwar 
Congo, white-haired now, rail thin, charismatic, and tortured by his 
past, despite the apparent comfort of his social status, is the chief pro-
tagonist in this creative venture. As he moves from scene to scene, 
What Authorizes the Image? 341 
we are thrust into his visual world. Culturally immersed in the west-
erns and crime noirs of Hollywood, Congo's visual vocabulary is rich 
and astute. He uses his film knowledge to play out fantasies of denial 
together with recollections of violence and death that incessantly fill his 
mind, some images more persistently, more hauntingly, than others. As 
it turns out, nightmares disturb Congo's sleep. He can't stop seeing the 
open eyes of the decapitated head of a random victim that he left like 
litter on the killing ground. As if to purge his demons, Congo stages 
his worst deeds, one after another. Brutal scenes of sadistic torture and 
killing by strangulation with a wire, in which Congo sometimes is the 
killer, sometimes the victim, are interspersed with majestic waterfalls, 
beautiful dancing girls, and carnivalesque cross dressing (for Congo, 
the would-be film director, is well aware that an audience also must 
have beauty and humour or they will turn their attention elsewhere). 
Bizarre, surreal, perverse: the film moves from one scene to the next, 
accelerating into the terrible fever dream that we come to recognize as 
Congo's anguished internal state. As if the impossible cognitive disso-
nance in which he lives, oscillating between "state hero" and "murder-. 
ous beast," cannot hold. The visual economy of Congo's existence is 
one of terror and violence. One image follows another, dizzying in their 
mad profusion. Nothing adds up. Congo's baroque world of proliferat-
ing spectacles of extreme violence and sensual delight remains unstable 
at its core. Perhaps that is what animates the profusion in the first place. 
The nothingness at the centre of vision must be avoided at all costs, for 
fear of total collapse.48 
The folly of Congo's visual staging is soon evident. The cumulative 
details of self-deceptive denial and self-lacerating violence (as in the 
scene where a crazed perpetrator forces Congo's decapitated head to 
swallow his own liver) know no resolution. They can only quicken. 
And as they quicken, the fever dream intensifies, until it finally reaches 
a culmination - and the house of cards that is Anwar Congo's mental 
world falls apart. That collapse appears in the final scene in "The Act of 
Killing." We see Congo standing on the same rooftop where he killed so 
many of his victims in cold blood decades ago. He is silent, seemingly 
reflective. And then he begins to heave, again and again convulsive 
retching overtakes his frail, wracked body. It is the body's unconscious 
knowledge enacting what Congo's tortured mind lacks the power to 
utter. Not just an isolated killer, but a whole society, a political regime 
based squarely upon a massive outburst of killing, has been revealed in 
a vertiginous, baroque image world well suited to feverish horror. The 
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root of that horror and the futility of its denial are laid bare: the rotten-
ness at the state's core. As Freud wrote of Daniel Paul Schreber: "His 
subjective world has come to an end since his withdrawal of his love 
from it."49 An internal catastrophe that mirrors the external catastrophe 
in which Congo all too willingly participated has finally come to domi-
nate the world in which he lives. 
Here is a living image of law in the flesh, suited to a failed political 
state under neo-baroque conditions: a world of incessant tableaux and 
transmuting personas, one supplanting the other in quick succession, 
one after another passing away in a wild proliferation of transmogrify-
ing images, bound in the end to run their final catastrophic course: the 
heaving, mute, destitute body. Congo is trapped in a perpetual state 
of emergency. No matter how many representational forms or visual 
images may be placed at his disposal, the result remains the same. End-
game. Psychological catastrophe within, legal and political catastrophe 
without. And here, allegorically speaking, is where Indonesian society 
might remain, unable to acknowledge its violent past, continuing its 
acts of denial and oppression. Here at the zero point of politics, a state 
of terror within collectively mirrors a state of terror without. 
In his second film, Oppenheimer shifts from the perpetrator's mind-
set to that of the victim. Along the way, we witness a corresponding 
shift in visual economy. Adi is now the main protagonist. His brother, 
Ramli, was brutally tortured, mutilated, and killed during the Indone-
sian genocide, a year before Adi was born. Working now as an optom-
etrist, living amidst his brother's killers, Adi's life mission is to speak 
truth to power. But it is not vengeance that motivates him. Rather, it is 
the need to pierce the veil of oppressive silence, to confront the killers 
with their feckless denials, their empty fantasies, their perverse bra-
vado. Do you not see it was wrong? Have you no remorse, no regret? 
Such is Adi's refrain as (in no idle metaphor) he calmly fits lenses on the 
eyes of the killers around him, or sits across from them, including those 
in positions of significant political power. 
Forced to hide his identity, resisting threats of renewed violence if he 
continues to speak the unspeakable about the past, Adi persists in his 
questioning. 
lf only the killers could acknowledge the wrongness of their actions, 
if only they could take responsibility, and apologize, face to face with 
the survivors of so many innocent victims, perhaps reconciliation 
might become possible. Perhaps politics may begin anew, based not on 
violence, but rather on a deep commitment to empathy (even with the 
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Figure 14.2 Adi questions Commander Amir Siahaan, one of the death squad 
leaders responsible for his brother's death during the Indonesian genocide, 
in Joshua Oppenheimer's documentary "The Look of Silence." Courtesy of 
Drafthouse Films and Participant Media. 
perpetrators) combined with a profound moral conviction regarding 
the necessity of taking responsibility and seeking forgiveness. That is 
the moral thrust of truth and reconciliation in Adi's steady gaze. 
The aesthetic register of Adi's gaze contrasts sharply with that of 
Anwar Congo. The vertiginous, unstable images of Congo's fever 
dream have now given way to something calm and steady. Adi's gaze 
holds us; it is stable, securely rooted. The silence of the dead, and 
the dignity of the living who survive them, pervades every scene in 
"The Look of Silence." In these scenes the corporeal image is suffused 
with the incalculable demands 9f human suffering, and perhaps, too, 
the infinite majesty of human nobility. Adi's morally stable universe is 
sustained by the human capacity for relationship, radical empathy, and 
the redemptive possibility of forgiveness -perhaps even love. In scene 
after scene of everyday life, "The Look of Silence" models for us Adi's 
capacity for love: love of his elderly, long-suffering parents, for whom 
he must now care, love of his lost brother, who so many years ago. set in 
motion the ethical demand of Adi's life mission, and love for his chil-
dren who will inherit a legacy of suffering and injustice. We see this in 
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simple scenes of everyday life: Adi washing his blind and nearly deaf 
and demented father - unable now to escape the prison of his grief; Adi 
speaking in close intimacy with his careworn mother as she cracks nuts 
on a stone; Adi playing with his young daughter, jumping delightedly 
on her bed as she humorously mimics her father's sales pitch for new 
glasses, and Adi walking with his older son, solemnly explaining the 
lies his teachers are telling him at school. 
These scenes of the survivor's everyday life are suffused with moral 
fortitude and love. But above all it is the silence of countless victims 
that animates Adi's gaze in the face of the killers around him, intensi-
fying Adi's morally robust silence against the crude pitch of the per-
petrators' threats and deceptions. The filmmaker's love for Adi, and 
for Adi's parents and children, instantiates and models the moral force 
that pervades the visual economy of "The Look of Silence," holding out 
hope for political renewal through redemptive justice. 
Two films; two different interventions in the history of mass murder. 
One, a fever dream of incessantly shifting personas, disguises, oscillat-
ing wildly from self-deceit to self-conviction, showing us what it is like 
to look in the mirror of a perpetrator's life - a life lived in the home-
less terror of unacknowledged guilt and shame. Th~ second, almost an 
idyll- but for the background of violence and death, and the exquisite, 
almost unbearable suffering left in their wake. Yet, for all that, Adi's 
calm gaze prevails. We see what it is like to look in the mirror of a 
victim condemned to live behind a veil of oppressive silence, but who 
refuses to succumb - not with violence or cries for retribution, but with 
dignity and moral conviction vouchsafed by the silent authority of the 
dead. Adi's gaze aims for forgiveness and reconciliation once the kill-
ers themselves, along with those whose power can be directly traced to 
that horrific origin, acknowledge the truth, and take responsibility for 
the wrongs they have committed. 
Two different gazes, two different image worlds - together constitut-
ing the visual economy of contemporary Indonesia. But this is not sim-
ply an allegory of a society internally riven by a history of unspeakable 
violence and oppressive silence. It is also a symbolic visualization of the 
way law confronts violence (or fails to), and the way it moves from its 
own originary violence to the redemptive possibility of renewed love 
for the world. It places before us, in corporeal images of almost unbear-
able intensity, the mute knowledge of the body: its fevers, its fantasies, 
its wretchedness, as well as its dignity, its sweetness, its moral right-
ness, and its capacity to empathize and to love. Oppenheimer takes us 
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to the heart of human mystery in a visual economy that pulsates with 
an unrepresentable surplus. From the esoteric challenge of abstract 
expressionist fields we have travelled to an almost "microscopically" 
examined representational particularity: a handful of perpetrators, a 
single family of survivors, among an unfigurable backdrop of so many 
others, in a world so intimately portrayed as to ask of us, as Oppen-
heimer wishes to ask, what would it be like to be this family: to "feel 
you are Adi, or your brother is Adi, and Adi's parents are your parents, 
your grandparents; Adi's children are your children?"50 In this visual 
economy intimacy, empathy, and love pulsate with an uncanny excess. 
It is this surplus in representational particularity, Oppenheimer tells 
us, that makes us care.51 Perhaps it even makes us want to participate 
in what is being performed on the screen, inviting, enticing, inducing 
us to enter and invest in this visual economy, to make it our own, even 
for law's and politics' sake. In this visual economy, the corporeal image 
provides a basis for stabilizing and legitimating the way we manage 
and maintain shared beliefs and values in society, the way we make a 
place (oikos) for normative reality (nomos). 
And so we see the ethical and aesthetic join together in an integrated 
visual economy that traces law's tragic origin in violence to its possible 
future in redemptive justice. Two different interventions, two different 
ruptures: one, the rupture of the veil of denial and lies; the other, the 
rupture of an oppressive silence with moral responsibility and the hope 
of reconciliation. Notably, this dialectical integration of the ethical and 
the aesthetic draws upon all the resources of the body. As Oppenheimer 
puts it, in a description of the film editing process: "I wonder whether 
this ability to find that mystery ... has to do with the fact these [editorial] 
decisions ... are like decisions of all your senses, your tastes, your feel-
ing, your ears, your stomach, your smell. I'm working in a place that is 
not about words."52 Rather, a fundamental, unfigurable mystery, a sub-
lime presence, if you will, unites us through the corporeal image. In that 
presence the immorality of social and political corruption is manifest.53 
This is Oppenheimer's ethical phenomenology of the empathic gaze. In 
empathy, even with a mass murderer like Anwar Congo, we may learn 
to acknowledge and responsibly confront the vast complexity of human 
nature. For in this view, Anwar Congo is not simply a killer to be dealt 
with by the punitive force of law, but also a human being haunted by 
the internal terror that his violent deeds have wrought. 
With this realization of the shocking, almost unacceptable com-
plexity of humanity we are in a position to seek something more than 
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retribution. For retribution remains insensible to the moral responsibil-
ity and, along with it, the possibility of reconciliation that comes with 
redemptive justice. Thus, Oppenheimer's radically empathic visual 
economy of law and politics invites us not to endlessly repeat the mis-
takes of supplanting one form of violence with another, or one form of 
false closure with another - whether it is the perpetrator's self-deceit, 
in fantasy or other forms of denial, or the victim'.s (and society's ritual 
performance of) false hope that now, at last, the monsters among us 
have been purged from the body politic.54 This visual economy of law 
cultivates a deeply embodied moral knowledge that makes reconcilia-
tion imaginable. It is, as Oppenheimer puts it, "the only way to achieve 
the widest possible human dignity."55 
In confronting violence and terror, empathy and love seek to provide 
a home for the ghost that haunts the Hobbesian legal machine, and all 
comparable legal systems that remain valid but lack significance. It is 
not enough to bind the body politic with fear, as Hobbes believed. Fear 
may prompt obedience, even acquiescence, but it will never inspire 
empathy or fidelity based on a libidinal cathexis that makes a shared 
world truly our own. As Giambattista Vico wrote over three centu-
ries ago: "The soul of man must be enticed by corporeal images and 
impelled to love, for once it loves it is easily taught to believe. Once it 
believes and loves, the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to 
break its inertia and force it to will."56 
Without that investment, that erotic cathexis as we might put iftoday, 
legal validity without significance is bound to decay, and fall back into 
the nothingness .of bare life, a fate akin to the collapse of the vertiginous 
image world of Anwar Congo at the end of "The Act of Killing." It is 
this catastrophe to which our prolonged crisis of legitimation points. 
It is the historic burden of justice to avert that fate. These, then, are the 
stakes when we ask what constitutes sovereignty in our time, which 
is another way of asking, in what visual economy does law manage 
shared beliefs, values, and the circulation of power in the material 
world? 
Conclusion 
The challenge of authorizing the image in the visual economy of law is 
twofold: First, we must learn the different ethical and aesthetic registers 
that operate within the different visual economies of our time. This is 
a matter of visual literacy. It portends the ascendance of visual rhetoric 
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as a major player in the theory and practice of law. Second, we must 
embrace the ontological (perhaps metaphysical) challenge that accom-
panies the exploration of non-conceptual, non-metrical, embodied 
forms of knowing, as we grapple with the complexity of the uncanny 
surplus of corporeal images. Different kinds of images circulate in dif-
ferent visual economies - from the iconic incarnation of early modern 
legal emblems to modernist abstraction (David and Rothko) and sub-
lime representation (Oppenheimer), to images as measured imitation 
(in the adequation of copy and model) or brute sensorial intensity, in 
horror and delight (as we find in the crypto-legitimating charade of the 
digital simulacrum).57 
In the modern era, the artwork may have "replace[d] the cult of 
the holy image."58 But aesthetics alone will not vouchsafe the visual 
economy of the law. Law's economy also must be linked to our ongo-
ing commitment to justice. That commitment grows out of a renewed 
encounter with an interior libidinal source - in painting, film, and video 
images on screens large and small - whose ongoing collective invest-
ment binds us to the nomos in which we live. In so doing we legitimate 
the living spirit of law's humanity.59 In the ethically inflected aesthetic 
of post-secular jurisprudence, justice is to jurisprudence as beauty ~s to 
art.60 The authority of law as image arises out of and circulates within 
an infinite field that we call justice. Eros is the name we give to that 
creative force out of which political worlds are made, from bare life, 
from the poHtical unconscious known as the flesh of the law. Law's sig-
nificance finds its uncanny source in that invisible presence. Where the 
flesh appears as libidinal excess there lies the source of authority, the 
spirit of the law that binds us. As distant as an abstract expressionist 
canvas, as close as any neighbour, or indeed any screen on which the 
neighbour becomes real to us, that is where we simultaneously behold 
both the subject and source of law's judgment and authority. This is 
how law persists, iconically, perhaps kenotically, in shimmering corpo-
real images. 
In every era the visual economy of law as image must be learned, 
perhaps even created anew, so that the uncircumscribable nature of its 
ethical source will be understood, remembered, and practised in the 
ways of its time. This realization augurs a renewed integration of law 
and the humanities,61 including a renewed reflection upon political the-
ology and the wisdom of the heart in a post-secular age. 
For this task to be realized, artist and judge, poet and legislator, need 
to engage one another in a joint effort to re-authenticate the symbolic 
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basis for our political union. The remains of transcendental excess, 
incarnate in the immanent wound of the flesh, must be re-encountered 
anew. Without this, we risk becoming as destitute as Anwar Congo 
at the end of "The Act of Killing." That is the contemporary lesson of 
the poetic and ethically resonant film work of Joshua Oppenheimer, 
work that may betoken a sea change in the visual economy of values 
and beliefs in which images and laws circulate in society. With radi-
cal empathy and the libidinal excess of love that binds us to the world 
and to others around us, hope for political renewal remains. That is the 
redemptive promise that we learn from the visual economy of Adi's 
steady ethical gaze in "The Look of Silence." 
Re-authorizing the image of law in our time calls for a reimagined 
visual economy in which the ethical sublime, the invisible source of 
law's excess (justice as an expression of love?) remains before us: ach-
ingly out of reach, yet beckoning, demanding, entreating. As before a 
roseate light, rising. 
NOTES 
1 Katharina Grosse, http://bombmagazine.org/article/ 4910/ katharina-
grosse. 
2 Werner Herzog, "On the Absolute, the Sublime, and Ecstatic Truth," Arion 
17, no. 3 (2010): 1-12. 
3 Oikonomia carries the general sense of "stewardship" or wise and 
responsible management or administration of something. It also resonates 
with "equity" in the sense of easing the letter of the law by invoking its 
spirit. See John Sabu, "The Theology of Oikonornia and Its Implications 
for Sacramental and Ecumenical Perspectives," doctoral dissertation 
(Faculteit Theologie en Religiewetenschappen, Leuven, 2007), https:/ I 
theo.kuleuven.be/ apps/ doctoral theses/ 69. 
4 For Rothko the space the eye inhabits is the key to the artist's vision. See 
Mark Rothko, The Artist's Reality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998), 59. 
5 Simon Goldhill, "Refracting Classical-Vision: Changing Cultures of 
Viewing," in Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay, eds, Vision in Context (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 17-[Iliad, 21.108]. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
7 See Marie-Jose Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy: The Byzantine Origins of the 
Contemporary Imaginary (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 5. 
What Authorizes the Image? 349 
8 See Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: 
The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993). See also Richard K. Sherwin, 
Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques & Entanglements 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2011). 
9 See Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images (University Park, PA: 
Penn State University Press, 2005), 11-52, 200-28. 
10 Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 8. 
11 See Peter Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 16. Mondzain uses the term 
"iconocracy." See Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy, 152. 
12 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968), 227-34. 
13 On the differentiation of affect, feeling, and emotion, see Richard K. 
Sherwin, "Too Late for Thinking," Journal of Law, Culture, & the Humanities, 
doi:1743872115611500 (13 October 2015). 
14 See Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 3-15. 
15 See Richard K. Sherwin, "Sublime Jurisprudence: On the Ethical 
Education of the Legal Imagination in Our Time," Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 83, no. 3 (2008): 1160. ("Cartesian epistemology shifts attention 
from images to words, from the objective eye to semiotic interpretation. 
Signs have no direct correspondence with what caused them. Signs 
signify. They stand for a word. This is not a matter of sense impression, 
as with the flow of species. In short, Cartesian modernity subordinates 
physis/themis [nature and natural law] to nomos [law posited as a 
cognitive and cultural interpretation or convention]. The classical and 
medieval link to the 'natural' order has been broken, and the modern 
dis-enchantment of nature has begun. Truth has now become the 
offspring of artificial linguistic conventions. The sign, on this account, 
is but an arbitrary association to an object or event rather than a natural 
resemblance.") 
16 Ibid., 1175. ("The mimetic experience of being-as - culminating ultimately 
in the ethical experience of being-for-an Other, embodies a sublime 
epistemology rooted in self-transcendence and the metaphysics of poetic 
representation. It is this natural mimetic endowment that allows humans 
to become one with an object [in the act of naming] or with other cultures 
,and their associated mindsets during other times [in the act of discerning 
linguistic, philological, and mythic patterns throughout history]. Mimesis, 
the faculty of imitation through being-as, is simultaneously the condition 
350 Richard K. Sherwin 
for knowledge and a basis for wonder.") See also Mihai Spariosu, Mimesis 
in Contemporary Theory (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1984), iii. 
17 See Paul Ricoeur, "Between Rhetoric and Poetics," in Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 351. ("It is only through a grave misinterpretation that the 
Aristotelian mimesis can be confused with imitation in the sense of copy. 
If mimesis involves an initial reference to reality, this reference signifies 
nothing other' than the very rule of nature over all production .. . Mimesis 
is poiesis, and poeisis is mimesis.") See also Michael Taussig, Mimesis 
and Alterity (New York: Routledge, 1993), xviii, 38, 40 (adopting Walter 
Benjamin's understanding of the mimetic faculty as the "compulsion 
to become the Other" and describing sentience as taking us "outside 
of ourselves" in the "instantaneous" and "mystical" flash which is the 
"perception of similarity"). 
18 Even a legal positivist like H.L.A. Hart seemed to sense the need for such 
a legitimating source of law. His very insistence on the "minimum content 
of natural law" belies his positivist pretensions. Hart would lay claim to a 
purely "sociological" sense, but his willing use of the phrase "natural law" 
imports more than a strictly empirical sociology would seem to require. 
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 189-95. See also Richard K. Sherwin, "Opening Hart's Concept 
of Law," Valparaiso University Law Review 20, no. 3 (1986): 398-410 (on 
the failure of Hart's minimum content of natural law to ground legal 
obligation). 
19 See Gershom Scholem, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershorn 
Scholem, 1932- 1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 142. 
20 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 1998), 3. 
21 Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 164-5. 
22 See Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy. 
23 See Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political 
Theologi; (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Paul Raffield, 
Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 114. 
24 See Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, 218; Raffield, Images and 
Cultures of Law, 46. 
25 See Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, xvi. 
26 Ibid., 35. 
27 See Mondzain, Image, Icon, Economy; see Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the 
Art of Law, xxii. 
What Authorizes the Image? 351 
28 Goodrich, Legal Emblems, 264. 
29 Banquo, a character in William Shakespeare's Macbeth, was a general in the 
army of King Duncan. When Macbeth ascended to the throne of Scotland 
after Duncan's murder Banquo suspected Macbeth of the regicide. After 
Macbeth arranges Banquo's death, Banquo's ghost appears to Macbeth- first 
at a banquet (act 3, scene 4) and later in a vision granted by the three 
witches wherein Macbeth sees a long line of kings descended from 
Banquo (4.1). 
30 Eric Santner, The Royal Remains (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 4. Historian Edmund Morgan treats the People's two bodies in . 
terms of the felt need to separate the constitutive and self-limiting power 
of the People (their so-called transcendent or sovereign power), on the 
one hand, and the less lofty legislative power of practical governance (as 
subjects), on the other. See Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), 78-93. Deprived of the king's 
sovereign "majesty," as occurred in England with the departure and 
ultimate death of King Charles I in 1649, "Parliament ceased to exist, as 
did the commonwealtl1 of which it was a part" (88). 
31 Santner, The Royal Remains, 22. 
32 See, for example, the living symbols of legal performance in Grace Koch, 
"We have the song, so we have the land: Song and Ceremony as Proof 
of Ownership in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Claims," 
AIATSIS Research Discussion Paper no. 33 (Canberra: AIATSIS Research 
Publications, December 2012) (noting that in land-title disputes by 
Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia song and 
ceremony may serve as title "deeds"). 
33 Santner, The Royal Remains, 4. 
34 Ibid., 12. See also Carlo Galli, "Hamlet: Representation and the Concrete," 
in Graham Hammill and Julia Lupton, eds, Political Theologtj and Early 
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 70 (tracing the 
privatization of the state from the historical moment "when the sovereign 
monarch was substituted by the sovereign citizen"). 
35 Santner, The Royal Remains, 4. 
36 We encounter this terrible collapse in Franz Kafka's short, parable-like 
story "A Country Doctor" - in the image of the raw wound of the flesh. 
We encounter it as well in the famous case of Daniel Paul Schreber, a legal 
scholar and judge who succumbed to the pathology of unsublimated Eros -
the withdrawal of love from the world and others around him. Having 
mastered its subject, Schreber's abnormally involuted Eros burst out in 
florid forms of psychotic delusion. See Santner, The Royal Remains, 63-86. 
352 Richard K. Sherwin 
37 See Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenologt; of Aesthetic Experience (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989). 
38 I trace the phenomenology of the ethical sublime to Emmanuel Levinas in 
Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque, 184-6. 
39 Santner, The Royal Remains, 91. 
40 Ibid., 92. 
41 Ibid. See also Morgan Thomas, "Law and the Revolutionary Motif after 
Jacques-Louis David," chapter 4, this volume. According to Thomas, 
David's "Marat" "embodies a movement . .. between visual representation 
and an empty yet ineluctably material state of indeterminacy" (112). 
Thomas associates the "affective intensity" and "sublime effect" of that 
"evanescent presence" (113) with "the ethical notion of an irruption of the 
infinite in the finite" (117). 
42 Santner, The Royal Remains, 95. 
43 See Ji.irgen Habermas, Legimation Crisis (New York: Beacon Books, 1973). 
44 David MacDougal, The Corporeal Image (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
45 See David Howes, "Scent, Sound and Synaesthesia: Intersensoriality and 
Material Culture Theory," in Christopher Tilley, Webb Keane, Susanne 
Ki.ichler, Michael Rowlands, and Patricia Spyer, eds, Handbook of Material 
Culture (New York: Sage, 2006). 
46 See Jennifer Deger, Shimmering Screens (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota, 2006). 
47 See Sherwin, Visualizing Law; Galli, "Hamlet," 70 (noting that when 
popular sovereignty substituted for the sovereign king the citizen became 
"a sovereign spectator, capable only of consuming, in aesthetic enjoyment, 
a representation that made itself, over time, more and more irresponsible 
and ineffective"). 
48 I believe it is fair to say that in the character of Anwar Congo we are close 
to the unstable mental reality of Daniel Paul Schreber. Like Schreber, 
Congo, too, is unable to live in this world. For he, too, has de-cathected 
his libido from it, and· consequently suffers the throes of world loss. See 
Santner, The Royal Remains, ix- xvii. 
49 Ibid., 22. 
50 Richard K. Sherwin and Danielle Celermajer, A Cultural History of Law 
in the Modern Age (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) (quoting from 
interview with Joshua Oppenheimer). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
What Authorizes the Image? 353 
54 As Primo Levi put it: "Monsters exist, but they are too few in number to be 
truly dangerous. More dangerous are the common men, the functionaries 
ready to believe and to act without asking questions." Primo Levi, The 
Reawakening (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 228. 
55 Sherwin and Celermajer, A Cultural History of Law. See also Mondzain, 
Image, Icon, Economy, 78 (on skhesis as the core relation of the incarnational 
sacrifice). See also Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 177, 378-97 (on the 
relation between fraternal interrelatedness, love, and justice) and 
Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, 231 (on the quality of heart that 
anchors justice). 
56 Giambattista Vico, On the Study Methods of Our Time (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 38. 
57 The violent ritual of pseudo-legitimation in the age of the digital spectacle 
is on display in the immensely popular Hunger Games volumes and films. 
See Suzanne Collins, The Hunger Games Trilogy and the The Hunger Games 
(2012, director Gary Ross) followed by d irector Francis Lawrence's The 
Hunger Games: Catching Fire (2013), The Hunger Games: Mockingjay - Part 1 
(2014), and The Hunger Games: Mockingjay- Part 2 (2015). I am indebted to 
Professor Sidia Fiora to of the University of Verona for this insight. 
58 See Belting, Likeness and Presence, 490. 
59 Caroline van Eck, Classical Rhetoric and the Visual Arts in Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9. 
60 See Sherwin, Visualizing Law, 188-9. 
61 For hopeful thoughts along these lines by a Nobel laureate in economics, 
see Edmund Phelps, "What Is Wrong with the West's Economies?" New 
York Review of Books, 13 August 2015, 54. ("Education systems must put 
students in touch with the humanities in order to fuel the human desire to 
conceive the new and perchance achieve innovations.") -
